On January 21, 2014 the Chief of Defense Staff Air Marshal Alex Badeh, said “the military will bring the Boko Haram insurgency in the country to an end before April this year.” He went on to say that “it was mandatory for the military to eliminate the Boko Haram insurgency in the next three months in order to prevent a constitutional problem in the polity. I can say confidently that this war is already won.”
Not long thereafter, on February 24, 2014, Maj. Gen. Shehu Yusuf, the General Officer Commanding the 82 Division of the Nigerian Army, was quoted as saying that “We are committed to solving the problem in the North-Eastern part of the country. The crisis in the North-East is not a big deal. It is just that we have not come together to work out strategies to tackle the problems properly.”
And then on July 14, 2014 the Chief of Army Staff, Lieutenant General Kenneth Minimah, told the nation that the “Nigerian Army is getting new equipment that will enable it to fight against terrorism and combat the Boko Haram insurgency in the country.” He went further to say that: “The Army is making progress in its counter-terrorism campaign.”
In addition to the pronouncement of these military officers, President Jonathan has, on numerous occasions, assured the nation and the international community that his government was on track in terms of battling terrorism and Boko Haram; and that the group’s activities and reason for being would soon be brought to an end. But in spite of the promises and rhetoric, the group is getting more violent and more audacious by the passing of every month. So far, more than 20,000 innocent Nigerians have been killed and or wounded; millions have been displaced and or live in fear; and untold number of homes and infrastructures have been destroyed.
In all of these, several factors seem clear: First, the Nigerian government does not have a coherent and intelligent plan in place in fighting the group; second, it lack the political will to take on a group with moral, political and financial support in and outside of its current enclave; third; the military and the intelligence agencies – perennially underfunded and poorly trained — seems to have underrated the group; fourth, the Nigerian government seem to lack widespread international support; fifth, its approach to combating violent crimes and terrorism seems to be antiquated; and finally, the president himself seems to be equivocating and wavering in his determination and approach.
Five or so years after the advent of Boko Haram — and in spite of the deaths and destructions, what we are left with is negotiation. It is silly and disconcerting that the government does not even know who she is negotiating with, or who to negotiate with. This sloppiness came to light when Air Marshal Alex Badeh, along with Mr. Mike Omeri, the coordinator of the National Information Center, released a report saying amongst other things that there have been friendly contacts between the government and representatives of Boko Haram and that there was a desire and a willingness on the part of Boko Haram to “discuss and resolve all associated issues.”
As it turned out, the Jonathan administration negotiated with impostors or a faction of the group.
In the last couple of days, however, it seems the government has been negotiating with the right group and persons. But what does Boko Haram want? What is the group willing to give up and accept? Also, what does the Nigerian government want? What is it willing to give up? After all, for any negotiation to work and be sustained, all sides must be willing to make meaningful concessions. And meaningful concessions involve benchmarks and plausible degree of honesty.
There are no universal standards when negotiating with terrorists or terrorist groups. While some countries don’t mind negotiating with violent non-state actors, others don’t. For instance, European countries generally do not frown on negotiating with and paying ransom to terrorist groups; but the United State seem not to endorse or engage in paying ransom or negotiate with terrorists. At the very least, the US has publicly stated that it does not negotiate with terrorists. But should Nigeria negotiate with Boko Haram?
A negotiation would be in order if (a) an institution like the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was set up to engage and implement restorative justice; (b) the Boko Haram’s system and structure is completely disbanded; and (c) it’s reason for being completely renounced. And the Nigerian government must, on its part, agree to adopt new approach to national security and engage in actions that promotes national integration and humanistic development. Nothing else will suffice!
Nonetheless, Nigerians and the government must understand that negotiating with terrorist groups like Boko Haram comes with severe implications: The penalties can be dire and far reaching. First, there is no evidence that the group will abandon its cause; second, there is no evidence that affiliates in the Middle East, the Arabian Peninsula or those within the continent will “hands off;” and third, there is no evidence that its financiers will be satisfied with such a deal.
History has shown that there are people who derive psychological satisfaction and financial gains from wars and ruins and human suffering. And indeed, there are those who benefit when nations collapses or is undergoing fragmentation. As perverse as it may sound, there are people waiting in the wings to see the breakup of Nigeria.
The unknown question is this: If and when an agreement is reached with Boko Haram, will the government be able to contend with copycat? Will others come out of the shadows to challenge the Nigerian government? Or perhaps, some groups will come to think that the only way to command the government’s attention is through high crimes, violent crimes and political terror?
The answer to the aforeasked is “Yes!” It is precisely for this reason that the Nigerian government must adopt “new approach to national security and engage in actions that promotes national integration and humanistic development.” Or else, Boko Haramism will multiply. And to say that successive administrations helped in the coming alive of such groups is an understatement.
Different factors breed anger and crimes and violence and, eventually, terrorism. Since 1985 at least, our government made it possible for terror groups and fanatical ideologies to take shape. A continuation of the past will only encourage and lead to the multiplication of violence and terrorism. Negotiate if you have to; but you must know who you are negotiating with. What’s more, the entire process may even unravel — causing more pain and deaths and destructions.
