Just when the worst seems to have been seen or heard of sloppiness in governance capacity, the Jonathan administration manages to find a way of outdoing itself into further depths of ignominy. Last Friday, the federal government announced with fanfare, that it has reached a ceasefire agreement with Boko Haram, ostensibly to end the orgy of indiscriminate bestiality, which has claimed over 10,000 Nigerian lives, including women and children. The Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), Air Marshal Alex Badeh, directed the military service chiefs to immediately comply with the ceasefire, as further negotiations are brokered by Chadian President Idris Derby. The government reportedly had two meetings with Boko Haram before the unconditional ceasefire was reached. But the credibility of the ceasefire was put in doubt after dozens of women and girls were kidnapped from two villages in Adamawa by suspected militants. It is unfortunate enough that Nigeria has found herself in this quagmire, but whatever the case, the so-called ceasefire is no comforting news and the renewed attack is even more embarrassing. These confusing positions, of course, do not engender confidence. Nigerians deserve a full explanation.
There are indeed, other reasons to take the purported ceasefire with a pinch of salt. First, the deal was revealed, not through a clear and official statement to the Nigerian public which, as victim, is a primary stakeholder in the conflict, but as it were, sneaked into the public domain by the chief of defence staff at the end of the conference on Nigeria-Cameroon Trans-Border Military Operations in Abuja. “Without any prejudice to the outcome of our three-day interactions and the conclusions of this forum, I wish to inform this audience that a ceasefire agreement has been concluded between the Federal Government of Nigeria and the Ahlul Sunna Li Daawa Wal Jihad (Boko Haram). I have accordingly directed the service chiefs to ensure immediate compliance with this development in the field,” the CDS said.
This method did not reflect confidence and has not inspired credibility. Secondly, Boko Haram is a declared terrorist organization and subject to the full application of the provisions of the 2011 Terrorism Prevention Act, as amended. This includes a term of imprisonment of at least 20 years for any person who knowingly, in any manner, directly or otherwise supports in any way whatsoever, a terrorist group or the commission of an act of terrorism. For this reason then, it may be asserted that in principle, the federal government has been secretly meeting with persons wanted by the law to answer for their acts of criminality. The truce in itself is provocative and objectionable for the simple reason that it challenges the modus operandi of the government, advertising dealings with Boko Haram so blatantly, in the face of the proscription of the sect. Above all, such a major development should have emanated from the Presidency to the Nigerian people, only when something close to a certainty has been arrived at, and stating, of course, the terms of the deal.
In respect of method, it is widely accepted that governments, as duly constituted authorities do not, in principle, negotiate with terrorists. However, it is also a matter of realpolitik that secret negotiations may be held with terrorist groups toward fuller engagement and a negotiated settlement. This process must, however, be discrete and secret. Even big powers do this on the wise assumption that all fighting eventually end up on the negotiation table. While some respected Nigerians have hailed the federal government for negotiating the deal in so far as it will encourage meaningful dialogue, others have denounced it as morally and legally wrong and therefore unacceptable since it would entail amnesty for a murderous sect of misanthropic elements bent on frustrating the progress of human civilization, with dastardly, but cowardly acts of bestiality.
The spate of killings across the north in the past three years and the inadequacy highlighted in the military’s response to the terrorists’ brazen assault on the Nigerian state may have forced the government’s hand. This is understandable. But the government ought to have carefully weighed the odds against the ceasefire before going public. What is totally obnoxious and reeling of myopia is the belief that a ceasefire announcement would automatically translate into peace. It may well be that electoral desperation and the politics of 2015 informed the questionable deal. Either way, it portrays extreme naivety or callous disdain for public opinion; worse still, it conveys a message of contempt for accountable leadership. It reduces an important national security agenda to an absurdity. Well-meaning Nigerians are not likely to side with this kind of thinking, especially as the CDS did not disclose the terms of the “ceasefire” in such essential aspects as demobilization, weapons possession, territorial occupation, personnel deployment and withdrawal. If this non-disclosure was a deliberate strategy, then the need to make any public announcement should not have arisen at all.
It stretches good judgment, and it is very unlikely that there is any country in the world, where a democratically elected government would agree to a “ceasefire” with a non-state, outlawed terrorist group committed to the anti-constitutional act of trying to replace it with an Islamic system of government, and make noise about it. Without mincing words, it is a betrayal of the sacrifice and patriotism of the soldiers now battling insurgency. Worse still, the group is talking to the government like an equal, and demeaning as this is, it dresses the country in the garb of a banana republic, lacking the wherewithal to fulfill its national security obligations.
While claims and counter claims in officialdom persist, there are too many questions in search of answers. But the point must be made, and with emphasis, that the Nigerian state is not on equal standing with Boko Haram and cannot, therefore appear to be negotiating on equal terms. The group remains largely a faceless organization with no clear identifiable leadership, and its organizational structure is unknown, and its grievances and demands are not articulated for the purpose of serious negotiation. In the situation, it is important that the state must retain the upper hand in all spheres – military, diplomacy, and public communications. In military terms, the counter-insurgency effort has seen the terrorists contained; their capability to strike at will limited; forcing them to sue for peace. All these make the case against the ceasefire even more compelling.
All said and done, the announced ceasefire should compel deep thinking about the beleaguered and neglected citizens marooned in the north east of the country. In a country where one of the six zones that make up the federation is on the verge of excision, and thousands have been cruelly murdered by insurgents, Nigeria rests on the brink of perdition if promises to end the carnage are not backed by timely action. Another chapter in Nigeria’s life must begin, and the time is now.
