On Friday October 17, 2014 the Nigerian government gleefully announced to the world that a ceasefire has been reached with Boko Haram. But was there really a deal between the government and the terrorist organization, or did impostors reached a phantom deal with an unsuspecting government?
According to publicly available records, the Chadian president Idriss Deby Itno helped work out the said deal between sometimes between July and August 2014 and which culminated in his meeting with the Nigerian president, Goodluck Jonathan. The Nigerian President was said to have signed off on the agreement on September 9, 2014.
According to news sources, “Chief of Defence Staff Air Marshal Alex Badeh told senior military officials from Nigeria and Cameroon meeting in Abuja on Friday that a ‘ceasefire agreement’ had been concluded between the government and the insurgents.” He was also quoted as saying; “I have accordingly directed the service chiefs to ensure immediate compliance with this development.”
In line with what Alex Badeh said, Mr. Mike Omeri, the coordinator of the National Information Center, released a report saying amongst other things, that (a) there have been friendly contacts between the government and representatives of Boko Haram; (b) that there was a desire and a willingness on the part of Boko Haram to “discuss and resolve all associated issues and that the school girls and all other people in their captivity are all alive and well; and (c) that the group “have announced a ceasefire in furtherance of their desire for peace. In this regard, the government of Nigeria has, in similar vein, declared a ceasefire.”
Curiously, Boko Haram did not issue any statement but instead, less than 24 hours after the announcement, the group unleased mayhem – effectively bringing the said ceasefire to a halt.
But was there really a ceasefire? With whom did the Chadian president negotiate? Did his security and intelligence agencies confirm the veracity of those who broached the idea of a ceasefire? What did he know and why didn’t he know the things he should have known? What did he tell President Jonathan? And what made the Nigerian president believe his Chadian counterpart?
On the other hand, did Boko Haram really intend to engage in a peace deal, but somehow got cold feet ? Or perhaps, the Chadian and Nigerian authorities were dealing with a splinter group. Several years earlier, the Vanguard newspaper (July 21, 2011) reported that “Confusion has crept into the camp of the Islamic sect, Boko Haram which has unleashed a reign of terror in the northern part of the country for several months as the sect has split into two factions. One faction, the Yusufiyya Islamic Movement, YIM, has vowed to expose the other faceless group, which it described as evil group.”
Indeed, Danladi Ahmadu, the man claiming to represent Boko Haram is said to be an impostor, or at best, representing a different faction of the group – and not the Abubakar Shekau’s group. According to Ahmad Salkida, who seem to have a direct access to the group, the peace and ceasefire offering is bogus, “the Nigerian government has just been caught in a web of deceit.” He asked: “Where in the world will a government say they killed Shekau, two weeks later, met a delegation sent by the same Shekau to discuss a ceasefire?” And as far as he was concerned, “it is the Islamist sect that ought to announce a ceasefire and not the Nigerian government since it was Boko Haram that declared war on the Nigerian state.”
By the way, this was not the first time a bogus ceasefire had been offered the Nigerian government. It happened in early 2013. Back then, Salkida had opined that the peace offering by Abu Mohammed Ibn Abdulazees, was spurious.
Frankly, both episodes are nothing but failure of intelligence. Otherwise, how could the Nigerian security and intelligence agencies not have impeccable sources inside Boko Haram? Why have they not been able to plant informants? How could they not know those who sponsor the group and the group’s ardent advisers? Not to know these and whatever else they should have known about the group is nothing but sheer incompetence.
At the very least, it is a sign of managerial negligence when the nation’s three main intelligence organizations –the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), and the State Security Service (SSS) –cannot confirm identities – especially the identity of those claiming to have access to the leadership of Boko Haram. In the last couple of years, what greater threat is there to the peace and stability of the country? Time and again the federal government has been embarrassed because the aforementioned groups are wanting.
What if there was a ceasefire? Well, it really would have been a bad peace. A really terrible ceasefire agreement it would have been. For more than two years, the government has basically begged – pleaded with the group to accept presidential amnesty. At other times, it offered some sort of peace-deal. Otherwise, it engages in a stick-carrot approach. Unfortunately, none of the government’s tactics has worked. Instead, Boko Haram has been embarrassing it at every turn and opportunity.
Wars are very expensive; hence peace is preferred. But peace at what cost and on whose term? This group is said to be responsible for more than 10,000 deaths and 35,000 injuries. In addition, half-a-million or more people have been displaced and or become homeless. Not even the government knows how much damage, in dollar amount, the group has caused. Furthermore, it caused millions of Nigerians to live in fear. And of course there are areas you cannot quantify. For instance, its activities threaten our nation’s collective peace and sense of nationhood. Internationally and domestically, its reign of terror has been an embarrassment to the government, a stain on its image abroad.
Every Defense Secretary and National Security Adviser in the last couple of years has made promises. And every Chief of Army Staff and Chief of Defence Staff has boasted about how they were going to asphyxiate Boko Haram. Every Inspector General of Police and the folks at the State Security Service (SSS) also got on the boasting and chest-pounding train. Through it all, Boko Haram is still here, stronger and more daring.
The pertinent question now is: In spite of the damage Boko Haram has caused the government and the people, should the government beg for or consider a peace-deal with the group? Whether there is an acceptable answer or not, what baffles many is this: how was it that Boko Haram was able to hoodwink the Nigerian government into thinking and believing that a ceasefire was in place? How?
